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ARGUMENT
REPLY POINT I
CNA Does Not Own The Gross Judgment
THE CNA POSITION ON APPEAL CONTAINS TWO FATAL
ASSERTIONS: THAT CNA ACTUALLY OWNS THE
JUDGMENT, AND THAT THE GROSS JUDGMENT, NOT
THE NET, IS THE BASIS FOR APPORTIONING ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS. THESE ASSUMPTIONS ARE CONTRARY
TO STATUTE AND UTAH SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT.
A.

Introduction. CNA's position on appeal relies heavily on the

truth or falsity of two underlying assumptions: that CNA owns the judgment:
and that the parties' rights are based upon the gross judgment.

These

assumptions are contrary to statute and Utah Supreme Court precedent, which
is a fatal blow to CNA on appeal.
B.

The Two False Assumptions. As to ownership. CNA claims:

The Esquivels may contend that the fees and costs were taken out of
"their" judgment, but this, too, would be false. For as the governing
statute clearly provides, the judgment never really belonged entirely to
the Esquivels. (emphasis added)
CNA Brief 27(b). 1 A few sentences later, CNA concludes: "Therefore, if the
attorney fees and costs were paid by anyone, they were actually paid by CNA."

To find quotes easier, a page is divided into four imaginary vertical sections, (a), (b),
(c) and (d). Thus, "page 27(b)" signifies a quote somewhere in the second quarter of page 27.
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(emphasis added) CNA Brief 27(c). In other words, CNA paid all the attorney's
fees because it owned the gross judgment.
The second false assumption is that the "gross judgment" determines
how much CNA is apportioned for attorney's fees:
But both the statute and simple logic provide that fees and costs can
only be charged against a gross judgment. . . . CNA was already
charged once for the fees and costs when the $203,507 judgment was
reduced to $68,507. It would be illogical and unfair to charge CNA
with those same expenses a second time, (first italics in original;
other emphasis added)
CNA Brief 25(d), 26(b). This convoluted logic is an extension of the "CNA owns
the judgment" argument since it presumes that CNA has been apportioned all of the
attorney's fees and costs, satisfying §106(5)(a) of the statute. CNA Brief 26(d).
These two false assumptions pervade CNA's arguments on appeal.
For example, there is a big issue here as to whether CNA has been apportioned its
share of the attorney's fees and costs, as required by §106(5)(a), even though it
didn't actually pay anything. CNA's claim that it "was already charged once for
the fees and costs when the $203,507 judgment was reduced to $68,507" only
makes sense if CNA indeed owns the gross judgment, but it makes no sense
whatsoever if the Esquivels own the underlying judgment.
C.

CNA's Claim That It Owns the Judgment is Contrary to

Statute and Case Law. Appellate Procedure Rules 24(b) and (a)(9) require that

2

arguments contain "citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record
relied on." It is therefore astonishing that CNA offers so little support for this
crucial argument. For the proposition that the judgment didn't belong to the
Esquivels, CNA offers only:

"Subsection [34a-2-106] (l)(b) authorizes the

employee or dependents to bring a third-party tort action. Subsection (2) allows
the insurer or employer to do the same." CNA Brief 28(b). There is no other
explanation, discussion or case citation for this key argument. This Court has held
briefs to be noncompliant where there are no relevant citations to the record and
no analysis of an issue. Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1991);
Burns v. Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah App. 1996).
Contrary to CNA's claims, the governing statute provides that the
employee owns the action: "the injured employee . . . may have an action for
damages against the third person." (emphasis added) Section 34A-2-106(l)(b);
see also, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(4). Utah law further provides that a
personal injury action is owned by the injured person.2
However, Section 106 does provide that the insurance carrier "shall
become trustee of the cause of action against the third party." Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-106(2)(a)(i). (emphasis added) Nowhere is the carrier referred to as, or

2

Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(l)(p) (definition of "property"); § 78-27-38 (comparative
negligence statute); and Utah Constitution Article I, Section 11 (courts open to every person
"for injury done to him and his person . . . [and] shall have remedy by due process of law").
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implied to be, "the owner" of the cause of action. On the contrary, "the employer
or insurance carrier is made 'trustee,' not 'assignee/ of the cause of action."
Oliveras v. Four-Corners Caribou, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Utah 1979). CNA
apparently confuses its status as a "trustee" with that of an owner.
A leading Utah case squarely holds contrary to CNA's position, i.e.,
that the injured employee owns the cause of action:
Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the
plaintiff, the one who has suffered the injury and damage, should
have basic ownership and control of his cause of action. . . . [The
carrier] is the trustee for the plaintiff, the true beneficiary and owner
thereof, (emphasis and bracketed portion added)
Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38 at 40 (Utah 1973). Lanier also destroys CNA's
argument that the gross judgment governs the parties' rights:
The interest of the carrier extends only to the amount of
compensation it has paid; and its only real interest is to obtain its full
reimbursement, (emphasis added)
Id. CNA obviously cannot have an interest in the gross judgment when its interest
is limited to reimbursement.
Professor Larson's venerable text rejects the argument that the carrier
somehow owns the cause of action or the judgment: "Under most statutes, the
third party suit, whether brought by the employee or employer, is deemed to be
primarily the employee's cause of action." Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen s
Compensation § 75.00 at 14-155 (1995). Larson also characterizes resulting
4

attorney's fees and costs as belonging to the employee, not the employer. See, e.g.,
Id. at § 74.32(a)(1), 14-139-40.
D.

Using Gross Tudgment to Determine Apportionment Is

Contrary to Statute and Case Precedent.

Who the "parties" are helps

determine whether the gross judgment or net judgment should be used. It stands
to reason that you can't apportion a non-party's interest anymore than the United
States could apportion Canadian tax dollars.

Worthen confirmed that only

"parties" are apportioned attorney's fees under §106(5)(a), and the term "parties"
does not refer to the original third-party defendants "who have no further interest
in it [the settlement] after paying it over." (emphasis and bracketed portion
added). Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 225 (Utah 1967).
Thus, one who has been paid (i.e., the attorney) cannot be a "party" for
apportionment.
Is the attorney a "party" for purposes of apportionment, as CNA
claims? Worthen says "no":
Therefore, the only possible "parties" who have "interests" in the
money are Worthen and The State Insurance Fund (the latter being
entitled to reimbursement). It thus follows that Sec. (1) [current
§106(5)(a)], with unmistakable clarity requires that the expenses and
attorney's fees be charged proportionately against these "parties"
(Worthen and The State Insurance Fund) as their "interests" appear.
It is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended this
application of the statute which comports with its equitable purpose
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than one which would bring about a contrary result, (emphasis and
bracketed portions added; parentheticals in original)
Id. at 225-6. The only possible "parties" for purposes of statutory apportionment
are the injured employee and the carrier. The attorney to whom money was paid
cannot be a "party." Since the only lawful "parties" are the Esquivels and CNA,
they can only apportion the neL judgment because they "have no further interest
in . . . [the attorney's fees] after paying it over." Id. at 225.
REPLY POINT II
No "Balance" to Offset Against Future CNA Liability
GOING FIRST TO THE "BALANCE" PORTION OF §106(5)(c)
AND OFFSETTING, AS CNA URGES, IGNORES THE
"APPORTIONMENT," "CREDIT" AND "REIMBURSEMENT"
PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE.
A.

Introduction.

CNA characterizes this case as "simple"

because allegedly one skips right to §106(5)(c.) and need only look for a "balance"
remaining after payment of the attorney's fees. CNA Brief 15(d)-16(a), 17(a).
CNA's "simple" formula is:
$203,507.25 - Gross Judgment
-$154.999.28 - Attorney's Fees and Costs
$ 68,507.97 - "Balance" -- to the Carrier
The §106(5)(c) "balance" must then "be applied to reduce or satisfy in full" any
future carrier obligation, according to CNA.
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B.

Contrary to Statute.

CNA's "simple balance" argument

sidesteps both parts of Subsection (5)(a) {ucharged proportionately against the
parties" and "to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee"), as
well as Subsection (5)(h) (reimbursement "less the proportionate share of costs
and attorney's fees . . . in Subsection (5)(a)"). CNA has skipped a few steps here.
The priority of §5(a)'s apportionment and "credit" requirements have been
confirmed by three Utah Supreme Court cases. See extensive discussion in
Esquivel Brief 10-17, 18-19 and 23(a-b).
CNA cites no case for its "simple balance" analysis. CNA Brief 19(ab). Furthermore, CNA virtually ignores Worthen, supra, which squarely holds
against its position. Basically, CNA attempts to dismiss Worthen in a footnote on
page 20 (with only one other brief mention on page 23 of its Brief). CNA does
not reconcile the Worthen "sequence" requirement that the allocation of attorney's
fees and costs comes "first" and as a "priority," and that reimbursement goes to
the insurer only "from funds remaining, and to the extent possible" and "before
the remainder is allocated to them as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3)."
(emphasis added) Id. at 226. CNA's feeble attempt to distinguish Worthen is
tantamount to an admission that Worthen holds against its position.

7

REPLY POINT III
No Carrier Priority: No Waiver to Defeat Legislative Intent
THE STATUTE AND CASE LAW DO NOT PROVIDE THE
CARRIER A "PRIORITY," BUT RATHER PROVIDE A
PREFERENTIAL RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT AFTER
ATTORNEY'S FEES HAVE BEEN APPORTIONED AND
CREDITED TO THE EMPLOYEE. THE CARRIER MAY NOT
MANIPULATE THE STATUTE THROUGH A CONTRIVED
"WAIVER" TO DEFEAT THE PLAINLY-STATED LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT THE EMPLOYEE RECErVE A CREDIT
FOR THE CARRIER'S PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF FEES.
A.

Introduction. CNA claims §106(5) "plainly gives the insurer

priority over the employee and his dependents . . . in the distribution of the
proceeds . . . ."3 CNA Brief 19(c), 22(b). CNA then claims a disingenuous
"waiver" of its §106(5)(b) right to "reimbursement." CNA Brief 17 (c-d). This
is an attempt to manipulate itself out of (5)(b)'s two hostile provisions which
deduct from CNA's reimbursement "the proportionate share of costs and
attorneys fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a)," as well as debits for employer
negligence greater than 40% (50% in this case). §106(5)(b)(ii).
B.

CNA's Claim is Only a "Preferential Reimbursement."

CNA inexplicably fails to cite Lanier v. Pyne, supra, a major adverse precedent
dealing with priority. CNA Brief iii-iv. Lanier addresses the difference between
a "priority" and a "preference for reimbursement." In Lanier, a cab driver was
3

Worthen actually holds the contrary. Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226, Esquivel Brief 19(a).
8

injured in a collision with a truck and was paid $3,301 in benefits. He employed
attorneys to sue defendant. Liberty Mutual, the worker's compensation carrier,
secured its own attorney, intervened, and then tried to claim that since it had its
own counsel "it is not required to participate in proportional payment of the costs
and attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff." Id. at 39. The court framed the
issue as: "whether it [the carrier] must bear its proportionate share of the fees
paid to the plaintiffs attorneys." (bracketed portion added) Id.
Lanier explains that although carrier reimbursement is a "first
preference," it only kicks in after the "sequence . . . in the statute":
It is because of the policy considerations just stated, and the sequence
of the grant in the statute, that we think it reasonable to conclude
that the rights conferred upon the insurance carrier should be
regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interests, . . . (emphasis
added)
Id. at 40. "Sequence" means apportionment of the attorney's fees occurs before
reimbursement and offset. See Worthen, 426 P.2d at 226. Hence, the carrier's
rights are "regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interest." Lanier, 508 P.2d
at 40.
Lanier notes that a post-Worthen amendment to Subsection
106(5)(b)'s predecessor made even more clear the legislative intent that attorney's
fees and costs be apportioned first:

9

The addition of the emphasized language to the statute seems plainly
intended to eliminate the previously existing uncertainty and to make
it clear that "the person liable for compensation payments [Liberty
Mutual] shall be reimbursed in full for all payments made less the
proportionate share of costs and attorneys' fees," so that the insurance
carrier will hear its proportion of these expenses, instead of having
them come entirely out of the plaintiffs share of the settlement,
(emphasis added; bracket in original)
Id.

Hence, CNA does not have a "priority," as it claims. It merely has a

preferential right to reimbursement, according to Lanier, after it bears "its
proportion of these expenses, instead of having them come entirely out of the
plaintiffs share of the settlement." Id. The Commission wrongfully awarded
CNA a "priority" in this case.
C.

No Waiver of Reimbursement to Defeat Legislative Intent.

CNA claims it waived4 "any right to reimbursement, so paragraph [34A-2-106(5)]
(b) does not apply." CNA Brief 17(c). There is no altruism here. Rather, this is
an opportunistic attempt by CNA to manipulate itself out of the explicit
apportionment requirements in Subsection 106(b), as well as the employer and
employee fault reduction requirements of Subsection 106(b)(ii) (75% due to the
respective fault of the employer and employee at 50% and 25% 5 ).

4

In a footnote, CNA tries to hedge its bet by claiming that the waiver of "any right to
reimbursement, however, [is] contingent on receiving a full offset." CNA Brief 17(d).
5

This particular point on Subparagraph 106(b)(ii) is largely irrelevant in this case if the
court agrees with the Esquivels' analysis since the credit for attorney's fees required by
Subsection 106(a) consumes the entire net judgment and any future offset such that it is not
necessary even to make the 75% reduction calculations. However, if this court should disagree

10

The Lanier court rejected a comparable argument:
The answer to this argument of Liberty Mutual is that its effect
would be to allow the insurer, by the simple expedient of declaring in
advance that it would not abide by the statute [by hiring its own
attorney], to defeat the plainly stated legislative intent that the
insurer's reimbursement should be " . . . less the proportionate share
of costs and attorneys' fees . . . " incurred in the action. This
certainly was intended to apply to the attorney's fees incurred by the
plaintiff. The trial court correctly ruled and required Liberty Mutual
to participate in its proportional share of the costs and attorney's
fees. . . . (emphasis and bracketed portions added)
Id. at 39-40. Likewise, this court should reject CNA's transparent legerdemain
which seeks to avoid mandatory §106(5)(b) apportionment by its disingenuous
"waiver." In the words of Lanier, this "simple expedient" must be rebuffed.
REPLY POINT IV
CNA Had Notice of the Third-Party Action
THE ESQUIVELS GAVE CNA WRITTEN NOTICE OF INTENT
TO COMMENCE A THIRD-PARTY ACTION. ADDITIONALLY, CNA HAD DE FACTO NOTICE OF THE ACTUAL
LITIGATION AND HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENTER AN
APPEARANCE, BUT DECLINED TO DO SO.
A.

Introduction.

CNA rationalizes the horrible outcome it

proposes (Esquivels get nothing) by suggesting it is actually the fault of the
Esquivels' attorneys, who "undisputed[ly]" didn't give CNA notice of the thirdparty action. CNA Brief 31 (d)-34. CNA argues: "If their attorneys had simply

with the Esquivels on the apportionment and priority issues, it should still hold that CNA's
interest should be reduced by 75% pursuant to Subsection 106(b)(ii).
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obeyed the statute," the Esquivels somehow could have avoided the "unfortunate
[result of going] . . . through a lot of effort for no net gain." (bracketed portion
added) CNA Brief 31 (b), 35(b). These claims are false and distorted.
B.

ALT's Factual Finding of Notice — Undisputed by CNA.

Whether CNA received notice was hotly disputed. R. 53, 68. In any event, the
ALJ made a factual finding that CNA did indeed receive written notice of a
potential third-party lawsuit in 1994. R. 165, HI.

A 1994 settlement

disbursement, signed by CNA, showed $10,000 withheld as an advanced cost for
possible product liability litigation. R. 124. CNA also received de facto notice
when CNA's attorney, Ted Kanell, participated in a deposition many months
before the case actually went to trial. R. 223-4.
The ALJ concluded: "Thus, it appears that there was a possible third
party action that could take place and that the respondents were informed about
it at the time." (emphasis added) R. 165. CNA thereafter disputed this finding
and argued its case to the Commission. R. 172. The Commission never even
mentioned the issue, tacitly adopting the findings of fact presented by the ALJ.
R. 262-3. Such findings of fact are accorded considerable deference and should
not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Morton Int'l, Inc.
v. AuditingDiv., 814 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah 1991).
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Lastly, opportunistic and self-serving comments that, if notified,
"CNA would undoubtedly have agreed to contribute to the costs" (CNA Brief
32(b)) are highly doubtful. CNA never offered to pay costs, despite months of
notice.
REPLY POINT V
Timely Appeal: No Basis to "Discount"
DISCOUNTING IS NOT REQUIRED OR PERMITTED UNDER
THE COMMISSION'S REGULATIONS, AS CLAIMED BY
CNA. ESQUTVELS' APPEAL OF THE COMMISSION'S ORDER
GRANTING CNA A DISCOUNT ON ITS FUTURE
OBLIGATIONS WAS TIMELY AND ESQUIVELS HAVE NOT
WAIVED THEIR OBJECTIONS ON THIS ISSUE.
A.

Timeliness. The ALJ made no determination that CNA's

obligation to the Esquivels should be "discounted"6 so as to extend the amount of
future offset to which CNA might be entitled. R. 161-8. Thus, when the
Esquivels responded to CNA's Motion for Review of the ALJHs Order, the matter
of discounting was still not at issue. There was no reason to address something
on which the ALJ had not ruled, i.e., discounting. Discounting only became an
issue when the Commission misapplied the provisions of the governing statute
§ 34A-2-106(5) and allowed CNA to reap a windfall to the tune of 122% of the

6

CNA's "discounting" argument involves taking the amount of offset to which it claims
it is entitled, determining the future value of that amount, and applying that augmented amount
so as to reduce its future obligation to make weekly payments to dependents. It has a crushing
impact on the decedent's widow and children.
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Esquivels' net judgment. Plaintiffs ascribe as error the Commission's actions in
this regard and now appeal that decision at their earliest opportunity. Plaintiffs'
appeal on this issue is thus timely.
CNA's cited cases of Brown <St Root Industrial Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n.
947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) andAlvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales, 681 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1984) are very distinguishable.

Litigants in both of these cases received

unfavorable rulings from the ALJ and thereafter failed to properly raise the
appropriate objection before the Commission, raising their objections for the first
time in their appellate brief. In Esquivel, the adverse ruling came not from the ALJ,
but from the Commission, and the Esquivels appropriately objected to the
Findings on this matter at the earliest available opportunity.
B.

Discounting Prohibited by Regulation and Case Law. The

Commission's improper discount to CNA is a question of law, and an appellate
court will give no deference to an agency's determination. State v. Penay 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994). Departures from agency rules which violate the rights of
litigants are viewed as unreasonable and irrational. See Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.
AuditingDiv., 842 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1992).
CNA claims that "[discounting is required under the Commission's
regulations." CNA Brief 37. CNA further claims that the three stated instances
which govern when a discounting or present value computation should be made
1.4

are mere "examples" and that Rule R612-1-4 (formerly R-568-1-11) does not
preclude application to the Esquivels' situation.7 CNA Brief 38. These assertions
are incorrect. Rule R612-1-4 was never meant to govern "lump sum" awards from
third-party tortfeasors. The Rule was meant to govern situations where the
Commission has ordered the employer to make periodic payments to an injured
employee or his dependents. The rule provides that the injured employee may
petition the Commission for a "lump sum" of all or part of the benefit award.
These types of awards, however, are infrequently made because of the desire to
protect people like the Esquivels.
This is not a situation where an employee's widow and dependents
are petitioning the Commission to award a lump sum in lieu of periodic payment.
Rule R612-1 -4 and Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421, however, were drafted with that
very purpose in mind: they were designed to restrict lump sum amounts to
recipients showing special circumstances, providing for discounting when the
Commission deemed a lump sum amount to be advisable. Absent some contrary
legislative provision, the usual remedies under common law should be presumed
to be in effect. This, of course, includes the ability of the employee to keep his

7

In support for its position that the three instances where discounting is allowed are nonexclusive "examples," CNA cites to the case of Willardson v. Industrial Commission., 904 P.2d 671
(Utah 1995). This case is of no help to CNA. Willardson concerned a statute which included
three different examples used to help define what a "significant medical issue" was. Id. In this
case, however, Rule R612-1-4 does not seek to define anything.
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judgment or settlement without having the employer "discount" to present value
the amount it may properly claim as offset under § 34A-2-106(5).
The case of Texports Stevedores Co. v. Director, 931 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1991) is instructive on this point. In Texports, an employer took the position that
it should be allowed to discount third-party proceeds since a statute existed that
would allow an employer to do so if the employer had brought and prosecuted the
action. Finding no statute that would affirmatively grant the employer the right
to discount, the court refused the employer's request to apply the "reasoning"
contained in a different statute. Id. at 332. Likewise here, this Court should deny
CNA's request for discounting based on "reasonable applications" of inapplicable
statutes, since, as mentioned, no statutory provision exists to allow for it.8

8

Because Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-421 does not allow for discounting under the facts
of this case, CNA's citation to State Insurance Fund v. Renak, 621 P.2d 714 (Utah 1980), which
concerned an employee's petition to the state insurance fund for a lump sum payment under the
predecessor to section 34A-2-421, is inapplicable. See CNA's Brief, 41. If anything, Renak stands
for the proposition that discounting will only be allowed where the strict terms of Rule 612-1-4
are complied with.
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REPLY POINT VI
No Unfair or Absurd Results
THE STATUTORY FORMULA PROPOSED BY THE
ESQUIVELS IS FAIR AND REASONABLE AND DOES NOT
CREATE ABSURD RESULTS, EVEN THOUGH CNA
RECEIVES NO OFFSET UNDER THE UNIQUE FACTS OF
THIS CASE. HOWEVER, CNA'S PROPOSED FORMULA IS
GROSSLY UNFAIR AND WOULD WORK A CRUSHING
HARDSHIP ON FUTURE INJURED EMPLOYEES.
A.

Introduction. CNA's recurrent theme is that the statutory

formula "leads to absurd results," and is unfair because CNA gets nothing. CNA
Brief 22(a), 21(a), 20, etc. It purports to prove the absurdity with mathematical
examples (CNA Brief 23), and claims that it is unfairly requited for its generosity
toward the Esquivels in the settlement of the original third-party action for
$375,000. CNA Brief 34(d). These arguments are all false or severely distorted.
B.

Inaccurate. Distorted Examples. CNA misrepresents the

application of the statutory formula with the example of a $50,000,000 judgment
that "would give CNA a setoff of only $48,857, less than one-third of its lien."
CNA Brief 23. However, there is an obvious math error in that "absurdity"
example (147,922 -J- 29,946,404), resulting in a true proportionate share of
.00494. not 0.494% as CNA claims. This unfortunate and embarrassing math
error makes, of course, a big difference, since CNA's true proportion of attorney's
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fees and costs would be only $667 ($134,999 x .0Q4939558), rather than the
$99,065 claimed by CNA. CNA Brief 23(d), fn. 4.
CNA also distorts Esquivels' Example No. 3 (Addendum Exhibit 5),
claiming that it is "patently absurd" to think that such a huge judgment
($814,000 in the example) "would not be enough to take care of a $20,000
reimbursement."

CNA Brief 23(a).

CNA fails to grasp the principle of

apportionment. To CNA, the only issue is a selfish one: is there enough to "take
care of its lien" after the attorney's fees are paid? However, the statutory issue
properly framed is, "What proportion of the attorney's fees and costs is the carrier
required to pay?"
Example No. 3 is a hypothetical based on some of the actual facts of
the case. CNA sees some gross unfairness in making it pay 34% of the attorney's
fees and expenses, when its interest was exactly 34% of the net judgment. This
ignores the facts that there is a $379,000 attorney's fee in this hypothetical,
generated through no effort of CNA, at the entire risk of the Esquivels, of which
the Esquivels are paying $250,292, or the exact 65% dictated by the Esquivel's
interest in the net judgment.
The object is to get the carrier and the employee to each pay a fair
share of the burden necessarily incurred in producing the "pie" to be divided.
Under the actual facts ofEsquivel, the attorney's fees and costs amounted to just
18

over two-thirds of the gross judgment, surely a rarity. At the same time, the
carrier's interest was exceptionally high because it was a death case involving a
widow and five dependents, paid out over 18 years, also a rarity. Therefore, we
have a high carrier interest applied against a low net judgment, which produces
the unusual result. There is nothing "unfair" about it; it is simply unusual. It is
much more fair to judge the statutory formula by more typical examples, rather
than judging by the atypical. See, Example No. 4 from Hum v. Nevada Bell, 114
P.2d 1002 (Nevada 1989) (Esquivel Brief 36) and the more typical examples
presented by Worthen, Prettyman and Lanier. See Appendix 6.
C.

Prior $375.000 Freeport Settlement. CNA claims that when

the first liability case against Freeport was settled for $375,000 in 1994, "CNA
could have insisted on a full offset against any future compensation liability."
CNA Brief 34(d). There was "more than enough money left over after expenses
to offset CNA's obligations for many years." CNA Brief 34(d). Although the case
was settled and is not at issue here, CNA's statements are false and distorted. The
Freeport settlement is a good example of how the statutory formula should work
and how unfair CNA's proposed formula would be.
The facts of the Freeport settlement were:

1

$375,000
$131,636
$243,364
$319,176

••
•
••
••

gross settlement
1/3 contingent attorney's fees plus costs
net judgment
carrier's Hen
19

R. 68, 34. As noted, the carrier's interest before the settlement amounted to $341
per week, for 52 weeks per year, for 18 years (until the youngest child, an infant,
turned 18), or $319,176. CNA would therefore have responsibility to pay all of
the attorney's fees and costs, or $131,636. That sum would then be credited to
the injured employee and deducted from the net judgment, leaving the carrier a
net future offset of $111.728 ($243,364 - $131,636). This is hardly an absurd
result. It realistically reflects the carrier's true economic interest, and pays the
carrier accordingly. Under CNA's proposal, however, the entire $243,364 would
be offset against future benefits, resulting in absolutely nothing to the employee.
Obviously, our Legislature could never contemplate such an oppressive and
crushing result.
CNA's allegation that it was somehow generous with the Esquivels in
the Freeport settlement is also false. These figures summarize CNA's reduction:
$341/wk x 52 x 18 = $319,176 [initial lien]
&205/wk x 52 x 18 = & 191.880 [reduced lien in settlement]
$136/wk x 52 x 18 = $127.296 [net reduction]
R. 64,119(b). CNA got a benefit of a $127.296 reduction, but should have only
had $111.728. and thus "cut a fat hog" to the tune of $15,668, at the expense of
the widow and children.
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D.

Future Unfairness.

CNA ultimately concedes:

"It is

unfortunate that the Esquivels went through a lot of effort for no net gain." CNA
Brief 35(b). However, CNA's position would work a universal injustice in every
case. The injustice is self-evident. If there is a "balance" left over after payment
of the attorney's fees, then the entire sum would be available for full carrier
reimbursement and offset in every case. This, of course, eliminates apportionment
of attorney's fees, and often the employee will suffer total offset of the remaining
judgment and net absolutely nothing.

The casualty here, of course, is

fundamental fairness.
E.

The Breen Formula is Not Based on a Different Statute.

CNA criticizes Breen v. Caesar's Palace, 715 P.2d 1070 (Nevada 1986), claiming
that Breen cannot be followed in Utah "because the statute in Nevada is
significantly different from the statute governing in Utah," and did not require
that fees be charged proportionately.

CNA Brief 24(c). This is a distorted

representation of Nevada law.
Although the Nevada statute did not have an explicit apportionment
provision, the court considered the legislative intent and "the purpose of the
statute as a whole as evidenced by the statutory scheme," to construe the statutory
scheme as requiring apportionment. Id. at 1072. Such apportionment is based
on "fundamental fairness." Id. at 1073. In a nutshell, the Breen court simply
21

construed the inherent structure of the Nevada statute as requiring
apportionment. It is grossly inaccurate for CNA to claim that the Nevada statute
"is significantly different" from the Utah statute. More accurately, the Nevada
statute implies apportionment; the Utah statute explicitly provides for it.
CONCLUSION
CNA's Reply Brief is built on a foundation of sand because it relies
so heavily upon the false assumptions that CNA owns the judgment and that the
gross judgment is the basis for determining the rights of the parties.

Both

assumptions are contrary to the Utah statute and applicable case law. Heavy
reliance upon these two faulty assumptions fatally infects CNA's position on
appeal.
CNA's "simple balance" approach is defective because it jumps over
the apportionment, credit and reimbursement portions of the statute, which
require apportionment of attorney's fees to occur before awarding the balance to
the insurance carrier. CNA's preferential right of reimbursement applies only after
attorney's fees have been apportioned and credited to the employee, and is not
equivalent to a carrier priority. CNA may not waive a statute to defeat plainlystated legislative intent. CNA received both written and de facto notice of the
action.

The Esquivels' appeal of the Commission's Order granting CNA a

discount was timely, and discounting is not available to CNA. There is no
22

unfairness or absurd result in applying the statutory formula as explained by the
Esquivels.
Justice requires that the Commission's illogical, unfair and oppressive
Order be reversed, and the ALJ's decision reinstated.
DATED this 11 th day of September, 1998.
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Tab 6

APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FORMULA
— Various Utah Cases —

Worthen

Graham

Prettyman

Lanier

Gross Settlement/Judgment

60,000

95,000

65,000

14,000

Attorney's Fees/Costs'

15,000(25%)

32,0002

21,667

4,667

Net Settlement/Judgment

45,000

63,000

43,333

9,333

Carrier's Interest/Lien

10,667

20,000

19,245

3,301

20.000=31.7%
63,000

19.245=44.4%
43,333

3.301=35.4%
9,333

3,556

10,159

9,623

1,651

11,444

21,841

12,044

3,016

7,111

9,841

9,622

1,650

Carrier's Proportionate Share

Carrier's Share of Expenses

10.667=23.7%
45,000

(% x fees + costs)

Employee's Share of Expenses
(total expenses - carrier's share)

Net Reimb/Offset to Carrier
(carrier's lien - carrier's share)

Note: The gross settlement, attorney's fees, and carrier's lienfiguresare based upon the actual facts
of each case, except where noted. The other figures are mathematical calculations. The net
reimbursement to carrier is the amount that the carrier "should receive" upon proper application of
the formula. As noted in Esquivel Brief 31-4, the attorneys in these cases did not make a request
based upon the statutory formula, but in most cases made a request simply for one-third of the
carrier's lien.

In some cases, costs are not known.
2

Estimated; fees and costs not disclosed.

